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Abstract
Shackle’s introspection-based theory of choice under uncertainty prefigured elements of both Simon’s satisficing
analysis and Prospect Theory but did so in a way aimed at providing an alternative to probabilistic thinking. His
theory focuses on creative, critical use of the imagination in assessing possibilities and potential for surprise,
and on the process of focusing en route to choice. This paper covers the genesis and elements of Shackle’s
framework and considers its implications for policymakers.
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Introduction
George Lennox Sharman Shackle (1903–1992) deserves to
be acknowledged as one of the pioneers of behavioral eco-
nomics because of his contributions to the theory of choice
under uncertainty, even though he did not base his analysis on
behavioral research and did not engage in any empirical work
to test his ideas. What he offered was based purely on intro-
spection but was rich in its psychological content, being built
around the notions of surprise, finite attentive capacity and
the bounded creative capacity of the human imagination. He
made little attempt to draw policy implications from his frame-
work, operating instead mainly as an economic philosopher,
critical of orthodox ideas. Indeed, his emphasis on ‘kalei-
dic’ shifts in expectations led some to view him as a nihilist
(most notably, Coddington, 1982). However, as this paper
will demonstrate, his way of viewing decision-making does
have significant implications for economic policymakers.
The genesis and essence of Shackle’s
theory of choice under uncertainty
Having done his undergraduate training as a mature student,
Shackle went on to complete his PhD at the London School of
Economics in 1937. His thesis (published as Shackle, 1938)
was on the theory of business cycles, initially under the guid-
ance of Hayek but subsequently much inspired by the work
of Keynes and Myrdal. He developed his key ideas on the
nature of choice in the period 1939-1949, first in a succession
of journal articles and then in his 1949 book Expectation in
Economics. This research was largely a spare-time activity as
he spent most of the period working in government service,
including statistical analysis for Churchill’s War Cabinet.
The novelty of his thinking attracted attention from lead-
ing contemporary economists such as Arrow and Klein and
in 1951 he took up the Brunner Chair in Economics at the
University of Liverpool, a position he held until his retirement.
However, enthusiasm for his theory proved short-lived and his
attempt to re-launch it via his (1961) book Decision, order and
time was not successful in rekindling a mainstream audience.
He then switched his focus to the history and philosophy of
economic thought and thereby began to earn enduring interest
from heterodox scholars (for detailed studies of Shackle’s life
and work, see Ford, 1994, and Earl and Littleboy, 2014).
Shackle’s key insight was that the concept of ‘potential
surprise’ could be used instead of statistical probability as that
basis for understanding how individuals cope with choosing
when they envisage a range of possible outcomes for some
or all of their options. Instead of asking ourselves what the
probability of an outcome is, we may ask ourselves how sur-
prised we would be if it eventuated. If we can see nothing
credibly standing in the way of a particular outcome, we will
view it as perfectly possible and not expect to be at all sur-
prised if it eventuates. By contrast, if we can see all manner
of reasons to doubt that a particular outcome could happen,
we may view it as impossible and expect to be astonished if it
does happen. Shackle saw this as much more logical than a
probabilities-based perspective as a way to think about uncer-
tain outcomes when taking decisions that people do not expect
to repeat and which could in some cases have major impacts
on their lives. (The latter he called ‘crucial experiments’.) For
such choices, an outcome either eventuates or it does not; it
does not occur, for the individual, with a statistical frequency,
even though, at the level of the population, statistics may exist
and be deployed in a probabilistic manner by, say, insurance
actuaries.
When all the potentially surprise ratings for a particu-
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lar scheme’s imagined outcome levels on a particular perfor-
mance dimension are represented graphically as a ‘potential
surprise curve’ it is conventionally depict outcomes viewed
as perfectly possible at the bottom, with the vertical scale
rising to a point representing maximum potential surprise (i.e.,
complete disbelief that a particular outcome could occur).
However, although potential surprise curves typically look
superficially like inverted probability distributions, the two
constructs are conceptually very different. Although complete
disbelief in a possibility is akin to a subjective probability rat-
ing of zero, a rating of zero potential surprise is not normally
equivalent to saying that something seems to be a sure thing
as other outcomes may seem perfectly or partially possible;
moreover, if we change our assessment in respect to a par-
ticular outcome, this does not necessarily imply any change
in our potential surprise assessments of alternative outcomes.
This is because Shackle’s analysis is non-additive. By con-
trast, if we were using statistical measures of probability as
weights in our choice, increasing the probability weight of one
outcome would necessarily require reducing the probability
weight assigned to one or more alternative outcomes.
Shackle’s view of how people choose if thinking in terms
of possibilities and potential for surprise went through several
iterations as a result of his repeated introspection on the topic.
Initially, Shackle (1940) took a view rather akin to that which
Simon (1957) offered in his ‘satisficing’ approach to choice
based around aspiration levels: he suggested that schemes of
action would be rejected if they seemed to have perfectly pos-
sible outcomes that fell short of a target level. Next, Shackle
(1941) came up with the view to which he seemed to return to-
wards the end of his life (in Shackle, 1986): he suggested that
people rank projects on the basis of (a) their respective best
gain that seemed plausible enough to warrant hope, and (b)
their respective worst loss that seemed plausible enough to be
a cause for concern. In other words, decision-makers would
focus on just two possible outcomes for each option, ignore
gains and losses that seemed too implausible, as well as the
outcomes between the two focal points. In taking this view,
he did not just anticipate Simon’s analysis by taking account
of the limits to human attentive capacities that might result in
information processing shortcuts; also, decades ahead of Kah-
neman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory, he was viewing
decision-makers as separating gains and losses into separate
mental compartments and using some kind of reference point
for drawing the line between them. This differs from the or-
thodox subjective expected utility approach wherein outcomes
are presumed to be viewed as absolute performance levels on
a scale, such as how much wealth we might be left with if we
make a particular choice, not the gain or loss in our wealth.
Shackle soon came to call the reference point the decision-
maker’s ‘neutral outcome’, portraying it as the return to a
seemingly safe ‘neutral scheme’. The reference point could
also be viewed as an aspiration level if Shackle’s framework
is applied to situations in which the decision-maker is not
sure whether some or all of the options under consideration
will actually be means of meeting a particular aspiration. In
seeking to formalize his theory, Shackle moved away from his
initial view of focusing, based around a cut-off level for the
plausibility of outcomes, and developed a theory of attention
that can be viewed as a striking precursor to the S-shaped
utility function of Prospect Theory (see Earl and Littleboy,
2014, pp. 167-177).
At the heart of Shackle’s theory of attention was his ‘as-
cendancy function’. Ee contended that small gains or losses
that seem perfectly possible will not attract our attention as
much as larger ones will; likewise, large gains or losses that
have all manner of obstacles to their eventuation will not
grab our attention as much as similar-sized prospective gains
or losses that have fewer barriers to their eventuation. Im-
plied here was an ‘ascendancy function’ in which different
combinations of gain/possibility or loss/possibility could be
ranked in their power to capture our attention. He depicted
this graphically via ‘iso-ascendancy curves’ that look simi-
lar to indifference curves in traditional utility theory, except
that there are separate sets for losses and for gains, facing in
opposite directions.
Shackle’s ascendancy function implies that normally, for
each possible scheme of action, there will be a gain and a
loss that most grabs the decision-maker’s attention but that
these will not be gains or losses that are either the biggest that
seem perfectly possible or the biggest that seem just about
possible; rather, they will lie somewhere between these points.
The somewhat plausible loss that most causes fear, and the
somewhat plausible gain that most excites hope, become the
focal points for choice. With limited human attentive capacity,
the other imagined outcomes for a scheme end up getting
ignored.
With our minds focused and the decision task thus simpli-
fied, we choose the scheme of action that offers the biggest
positive difference in ascendancy between its respective focus
gain and focus loss. This would be subject to the level of fear
regarding the focus loss not exceeding a tolerable level. If
rival schemes have focus outcomes with similar differences
in ascendancy, the decision-maker’s risk preferences will be
used to resolve the final choice. Moreover, the decision-maker
would stick with a ‘neutral scheme’ (such as staying liquid)
if none of the options viewed as offering prospective gains
relative to the neutral outcome had focus gains that were more
attention-arresting than their respective focus losses.
The significance of reference-
dependence and focusing
Shackle’s view of how hopes and fears drive risky choices
provides a means of making sense of how ‘mom and pop’ in-
vestors who normally seem to be playing safe get sucked into
playing financial and real estate markets during boom–bust
episodes. It is not that their risk preferences have changed;
rather, what changes is the neutral outcome against which
they are viewing potential gains and losses. Prior to the boom,
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a 3% deposit account might be their neutral outcome/neutral
scheme. However, if it becomes apparent that even those who
are playing the share market with relatively modest success
are achieving returns of 10%, a 3% deposit account may start
to seem to entail a 7% loss that could readily be avoided. In
theoretical terms, not only would potential surprise curves be
shifted to the right on a loss/gain scale but the neutral out-
come is also shifted to the right, as is the ascendancy function.
Though those who have knowledge of financial history would
see switching from holding deposit accounts to holding eq-
uities as a move into a more risky market habitat, the ‘mom
and pop’ investors, lacking long-term historical knowledge,
or having forgotten what happened earlier in their lives, will
not see it that way. If policymakers are keen to limit the scale
of a boom and prevent such investors from being casualties
of it, they should run investor education campaigns aimed a
deterring such shifts in assessments of reference returns and
downside risks.
Shackle’s theory of focusing also sounds warning bells
about risk-taking, for it predicts that even if dire downside
outcomes have initially been acknowledge as not being impos-
sible (i.e., the decision-maker has imagined them and would
not be utterly astonished if they happened), the focus loss
will be something less extreme. This does not bode well for
policies directed towards limiting global warming. If decision-
makers acknowledge that, because of modeling uncertainties,
a particular strategy might not be enough to stop run-away
human-induced warming, decision-makers may nonetheless
opt for it because they would not be very surprised to see it
containing warming within what are assumed to be critical
bounds. In terms of their risk tolerance, the focus loss may
not seem alarming enough to make them reject the strategy,
even though, at the outside, they had initially not ruled out
possibilities whose eventuation would indeed be alarming. In
short, we may end up taking dangerous decisions because the
loss that looms largest in our assessment is significantly less
bad than the worst outcome we deem possible.
If investment decisions involve the kind of focusing or
zones of acceptability that Shackle inferred, then policies to
promote investment will have impacts only insofar as they af-
fect which imagined outcomes would-be investors see as focal
gains or losses. Policies that aim to remove barriers to making
larger returns or that are designed to prevent poor outcomes
may fail to change behavior if they do not change focus gains
or losses. It is thus important for policy makers to find out
which outcome prospects generate the most excitement or fear
for rival schemes of action.
Imagination and expectations
Shackle portrayed the formation of expectations primarily as
a deductive, subjective process in which views of what could
happen and how seriously possibilities should be taken are
products of the imagination. His analysis thus contrasts with
that of Keynes (1921), which is in terms of inductive infer-
ences based on the weight of past evidence. Oddly, Shackle
did not discuss this aspect of Keynes’s thinking, whether out
of ignorance (as asserted by Brady, 2013) or for strategic,
rhetorical reasons in his quest to emphasize how expectations
can become detached from ‘real’ conditions and how past
trends cannot be relied upon to continue.
A more constructive approach would have been to argue
that expectation formation involves both inductive and deduc-
tive thinking. On the one hand, historical statistics and case
study evidence from similar kinds of situations may help us
avoid oversights that would otherwise arise due to failures of
our imagination, and provide food for thought when we are
trying to assess how seriously to take particular possibilities.
On the other hand, like members of a courtroom jury, we have
to figure out how to interpret evidence and which evidence is
relevant to our choices. Moreover, although nothing can be
imagined that is completely unprecedented, there is enormous
scope for wildly novel conjectures and ‘kaleidic’ shifts of ex-
pectations. This is because, as with a limited alphabet that can
be used to build thousands of words, we can potentially con-
struct a vast array of new possibilities by combining elements
from what we already know (Shackle, 1979).
The important issue here for policymakers is the extent
to which people use their imagination when choosing, and
how they do so. When combined with insightful, critical as-
sessment of what could intervene to prevent outcomes from
eventuating, such creative thinking can provide a basis for
successful entrepreneurial ventures. However, there is no
guarantee that the imagination will not result in dysfunc-
tional/pathological behavior in the form of reckless risk-taking
at one extreme or, at the other extreme, overly fearful reluc-
tance to act that is driven by concerns over things that may
never actually happen, at least not to the person in question.
The benefits of education that succeeds in enhancing critical
thinking skills (including skills in knowing how to gather and
use evidence from the past to assess future possibilities), and
willingness to use them, seem clear from Shackle’s standpoint.
This is despite the fact that, as Shackle (1961) recognized,
any attempt to work out how seriously to take a figment of
one’s imagination ultimately is doomed to run into an infinite
regress: event A may be assessed as capable of being blocked
by event B, but the latter might be blocked by event C unless
event D happens, an so on, ad infinitum. Policymakers thus
need to include effective stopping rules as part of training in
critical thinking.
Shackle’s perspective on the imagination points to a dif-
ferent view of the dangers of ‘thinking fast’ from that offered
by Kahneman (2011), though the two should be viewed as
complements, not rivals. For Kahneman, fast thinking results
in poor outcomes due to the use of bias-inducing heuristics
to make judgments from available information. In Shackle’s
analysis the assessments that people involve considering not
merely what they know but also things that they imagine could
affect what happens, Moreover, whilst a fertile imagination
can be used to generate possibilities and thereby assess po-
tential for surprise, actual surprises entail things the decision
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maker failed to imagine. We may infer from this that those
who fail to use their imagination to come up with relevant pos-
sibilities may leave themselves more open to nasty surprises
or fail to see good opportunities for what they are. Getting
‘ripped off’ in a transaction might reflect failure to check or
remember the details of the contract. However, from a Shack-
lean perspective, it may also be due to failure to devote enough
effort to using the imagination to generate possible ways in
which things could go awry and hence to failure to insist on
appropriate safeguarding clauses being inserted in the contract
in the first place.
Living in the present moment
Shackle’s view that a probabilistic approach to analyzing
choice is questionable in respect to one-off choices is normally
articulated in relation to life’s crucial experiments. However,
people may be prone to treat decisions that are not partic-
ularly unique as ones they will never make again: in other
words, rather than operating as incompetent statisticians and
making biased probability judgments in the manner presumed
in ‘heuristics and biases’ approach to behavioral economics,
people may simply not think statistically at all. This is evident
when people who are not liquidity constrained buy extended
product warranties rather than recognizing that, over their
lives, they will buy many products for which such warranties
are offered and hence that they would be wiser to decline the
warranties in favor of a repair-or-replace strategy for the rare
occasions on which such products fail. Likewise, the mystery
of the ‘equity premium’ can be resolved if it is driven by
people many years from retirement being worried about the
bigger risk of a sudden large fall on equities relative to bonds
despite history telling us that share markets normally recover
even from major falls within a few years and offset the losses
via above-normal returns. It would appear that the extended
warrant purchaser and financial market players are thinking
rather like children who wail inconsolably after unexpectedly
being told they will have to miss a friend’s birthday party,
despite parents pointing out that there will be plenty of similar
parties to attend in future.
Human tendencies to live, as Shackle often put it, ‘in the
present moment’, to fail to think in statistical terms, and hence
often to view disappointments as ‘the end of their world’ need
to be recognized by policymakers as a further reason for in-
cluding decision studies in school curricula. These tendencies
can drive impulsive and/or dramatic over-reactions to falsi-
fied expectations, including suicide, depression and panic in
financial markets.
Enjoyment by anticipation
In the process of developing his theory of choice Shackle
realized that human imaginative capacities make it possible to
derive enjoyment by mentally rehearsing events before they
materialize. Shackle raised the idea of ‘enjoyment by anticipa-
tion’ with reference to cases in which we make commitments
and then have to wait before we get a stream of actual con-
sequences, as when buying lottery tickets or embarking on
enterprises: until the results are in, our outlay buys us the
right to imagine good outcomes. However, this idea seems
relevant even when we are merely browsing online or ‘win-
dow shopping’ so long as the possibilities we imagine seem
feasible to us.
Being able to rehearse future situations in our imagina-
tion has a downside that may be a driver of procrastination:
the further ahead we start thinking about something, and the
sooner we make a commitment to it, the more scope we have
to imagine its unpleasant aspects. For example, booking a
holiday early gives us scope not only to look forward to the
holiday but also to exercise repeatedly our fear of flying‘. If
we anticipate that we ‘will be dreading the flight’ we may opt
not to make an advance booking, even at the risk of not being
able to book later. If people are to choose to do things that
they dread, they may need to be able to commit to doing them,
with little forethought, at the last moment and then immedi-
ately be able to put themselves through the aspect they dread.
A possible implication of this is that notoriously slow legal
processes might deter crime better than those involving sum-
mary justice, even if the conviction and sentencing statistics
are identical.
Conclusion
Shackle’s non-probabilistic analysis of choice may be useful
for understanding how choices get made on occasions where
people make serious attempts to figure our how the future
could unfold despite them being uncertain about what infer-
ences they should draw from the past. Via the role it assigns
to the human imagination, it points towards the importance
of capacities for creative and critical thinking as determinants
of economic wellbeing. The development of these capacities
should be a policy priority.
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